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Abstract
We use a money pump argument to measure deviations from the revealed preference
axioms. Using a panel data set of food expenditures, we find a large number of violations
of the weak axiom of revealed preference. The money pump costs are small, which
indicate that the violations of revealed preference are not severe. While most households’
behavior deviates from rationality, by our measure they are close to being rational.
JEL classification numbers: D11,D12
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1 Introduction
The assumption that consumers are rational is one of the oldest and most controversial
assumptions in economics. Conceptually, the empirical content of the rationality assump-
tion has been very well understood since the works of Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967),
Richter (1966) and Varian (1982): revealed preference theory captures the empirical
content of rational consumption behavior.
As a practical matter, however, revealed preference analysis presents two serious prob-
lems. One is that a data set either satisfies the generalized axiom of revealed preference
(GARP) or it does not; there is no room for judging how severe a violation of the axioms
are. We would like to measure the extent to which a violation of GARP indicates that
a consumer is irrational. The second problem is that GARP very often lacks power as
a test of rationality. Consumption data tend to exhibit less variability in prices than in
expenditure. As a consequence, it becomes very difficult to reject that consumers are
rational.
Our paper presents a new approach to practical revealed preference analysis. We
present a measure of the severity of a violation of revealed preference, and we use a
data set that seems likely to alleviate the problem of power. Our analysis revealed a
substantial number of violations of GARP, but the violations are not severe. Specifically,
396 out of the 494 households in our data set violate GARP at some point. When they
violate GARP, our money pump measure (which we define below) of the violation is
around 6% of expenditures; which we view as a small number.
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(a) (x, p) and (x′, p′) violate GARP (in fact
WARP).
x
x′ p
p′
(b) A more “severe” violation of GARP.
Figure 1: Two observations: (x, p) and (x′, p′).
We correlate our measure with demographic variables. Some results are intuitive:
Less educated, poorer, and older households make more severe violations of GARP than
do highly educated, richer, and younger households. On the other hand, households with
small families make more severe violations of GARP.
1.1 Money pump
A violation of GARP exposes a consumer to being manipulated as a “money pump.” For
example, consider the situation in Figure 1(a). A consumer buys bundle x at prices p
and x′ at prices p′. Evidently, there is a violation of GARP (actually of WARP, the weak
axiom of revealed preference) because x was purchased when x′ was affordable, and vice
versa. Knowing these choices, a devious “arbitrager” who follows the opposite purchasing
strategy (buy bundle x at prices p′, and bundle x′ at prices p), could profitably resell x
to the consumer at prices p, and x′ at prices p′. The total profit the arbitrager would
make equals
mp = p · (x− x′) + p′ · (x′ − x),
where mp stands for “money pump cost,” which we use to measure the severity of the
violation of GARP.
The idea that arbitragers can “pump money” from irrational consumers is not new,
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(a) Two observations: (x, p) and (x′, p′).
α
β
(b) mp = α+β;α = p·(x−x′), β = p′ ·(x′−x).
Figure 2: Money pump costs for Figure 1.
and it has been used as a reason for why one should not observe irrational behavior.
Therefore, the money pump measure defined above appears to be an intuitive measure
of the severity of a violation of GARP. Consider the situations in Figures 1(a) and 1(b).
Each figure presents a violation of GARP, but intuitively the violation in 1(b) is more
severe than the one in 1(a). The money pump cost reflects this difference. Figures 2(a)
and 2(b) represent the money pump cost: it is the sum of the translation of the p-
budget line (from crossing x to crossing x′), and the translation of the p′-budget line
(from crossing x′ to crossing x). The money pump reflects the severity of the violations,
and it is expressed in monetary terms, so the numerical value of a violation has a clear
interpretation.
For our purposes, the devious arbitrager is a fictional character. There is a debate on
whether irrational consumers would be driven out of the market, because of the actions
of arbitragers; see, for example, Mulligan (1996), Rabin (2002) and Laibson and Yariv
(2007). We do not take a stand on this debate: Our use of money pump cost is solely
a pragmatic application of the idea developed in Figure 1, showing how the pump cost
captures intuitively the severity of a violation of GARP.
1.2 Power of GARP
That GARP tends to have low power is well known. The vast majority of empirical
studies of revealed preference find very few violations of GARP. The basic issue is the
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following: In cross-sectional data, income variability is much higher than price variability.
As a result, budget sets tend to be nested, and no choices can violate GARP.
To address the problem of low power, we consider a subset of goods, food purchases;
and we consider household-level panel data, where the same household is observed making
repeated choices over time. We restrict attention to food because we do not expect
consumers to change their food expenditure very dramatically in response to changes
in income; we should see relatively more variation in the price rather than levels of
expenditure. Most food is a basic necessity, and the role for “luxurious” spending on
food is much more limited than for other types of good. We use a scanner panel dataset
of 494 families’ consumption purchases of frequently-purchased gropcery items over a two-
year period (see Section 4.1 for details). By using panel data, we can abstract away from
household-level unobserved heterogeneity, which may be driving the excessive variability
in expenditure levels observed in typical cross-sectional datasets, and which result in low
power of GARP tests. Indeed, we find many more violations of GARP than the rest of
the empirical literature, which suggests that power may not be a concern in our panel
data.
2 Related literature
The literature on testing the revealed preference axioms is large, and contains both
classical papers as well as more recent contributions. Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982)
are seminal contributions to the methodology of revealed preferences tests; Varian (2006)
provides a survey. Empirical applications of revealed preference tests have employed both
field as well as experimental data.
Many of the empirical applications using field data employ data from household-level
surveys (such as the Consumer Expenditure Survey in the US, and the Family Expendi-
ture Survey in the UK). Since tests of WARP/GARP require repeated observations of a
decision-making unit (individual or household) across different pricing regimes, thus well-
suited to panel data, an important challenge addressed in these papers is how to “match”
households across different time periods to form a synthetic panel. Blundell, Browning,
and Crawford (2003) and Blundell, Chen, and Kristensen (2007) address this issue by
estimating an “Engel curve” relating a household’s consumption to prices, expenditure
and household demographics, and test GARP by comparing the predicted consumption
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behavior of households with similar demographics and expenditure levels across different
pricing regimes. Hoderlein and Stoye (2009) take a more agnostic approach, and use re-
sults from the copula literature to obtain bounds on the percentage of households which
violate WARP in two separate cross-sections of survey data. In the present paper, we ab-
stract away from these difficulties by using a long household-level scanner panel dataset,
where the purchase decisions of given households over a two-year period are observed.
To our knowledge, empirical tests of the revealed preference axioms using scanner data
is new in the literature.
At the same time, a large literature testing revealed preference using experimental
data has also developed. These have employed both laboratory experiments (recent
contributions include Andreoni and Miller (2002), Sippel (1997) and Fevrier and Visser
(2004)), as well as field experiments utilizing unique subject pools (psychiatric patients
in Battalio, Kagel, Winkler, Fischer, Basmann, and Krasner (1973), and children in
Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001)).
It is fair to say that most of the empirical literature, using both field and (field and
laboratory) experimental data, finds relatively few violations of the GARP. Therefore, the
power of GARP as a test of rationality is a real concern; these issues have been discussed
in, inter alia, Bronars (1987), Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003), Andreoni and
Harbaugh (2008).
At the same time, revealed preference tests are quite stark, allowing for either rational
or irrational consumers. In practice, one would like to accommodate a grey area where
“small” violations of GARP may not indicate a worrying degree of irrationality (or may
indicate imperfections in the data). In the existing literature, various researchers have
proposed ways to quantify the degree of violations from GARP, including Afriat (1967),
Varian (1985, 1990), and Gross (1995).1 In terms of assessing the severity of violations
of GARP, our proposal is closest to Afriat’s efficiency index, and to the modification of
Afriat’s efficiency index proposed by Varian (see Afriat (1967) and Varian (1990)).
Given e ∈ [0, 1], let Re and Pe be the binary relations defined by xk Re xl if epk · xk ≥
pk · xl, and xk Pe xl if epk · xk > pk · xl. Clearly, if e = 1, then Re is the original revealed
1Apesteguia and Ballester (2010) axiomatize a measure of deviations from rationality. It applies in
general choice environments with finitely many choices. It does not use the special structure of Walrasian
budgets.
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preference relation, so if Re satisfies GARP then the data are consistent with rationality.
At the other extreme, when e = 0 then Re satisfies GARP trivially. Afriat’s efficiency
index is defined as the supremum over all the numbers e such that (Re, Pe) satisfies
GARP.
Varian modifies Afriat’s index by allowing e to vary across the different price vectors.
Consider a vector e = (ek)
K
k=1 of numbers in [0, 1], one for each observation. Define the
binary relation R as xk R xl if ekp
k ·xk ≥ pk ·xl. Define the strict relation P analogously.
There is a set of vectors e such that the corresponding R satisfies GARP. Varian proposes
as his measure the closest vector e to the unit vector (ek = 1), among those vectors for
which R satisfies GARP.
Here, we can interpret e as the amount of measurement error in prices which is
required in order to rationalize the observed consumption choices via GARP. That is,
how much larger than pk · xl does pk · xk need to be before we can conclude that xk is
revealed preferred to xl? If each observation is measured with error, for example, then we
can conclude that xk is revealed preferred to xl while accommodating an error of (1−ek).
Both Afriat’s and Varian’s efficiency indices capture ideas that are similar to our
money pump measure. The measures differ in their interpretation. The efficiency indices
reflect a tolerance to measurement error. We can interpret our measure directly from its
monetary value.
3 Definitions
Suppose that we observe the purchases of a single consumer when she faces different
prices. Observation k (k = 1, . . . , K) consists of a consumption bundle xk ∈ Rl+ that the
consumer bought at prices pk ∈ Rl++.
LetX be the set of all observed consumption bundles. That is, X =
{
xk : k = 1, . . . , K
}
.
The revealed preference relation on X is the binary relation R defined as xk R xl if
pk · xk ≥ pk · xl. The strict revealed preference relation is the binary relation P defined
as xk P xl if pk · xk > pk · xl.
The data satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) if whenever xk R xl
it is false that xl P xk.
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The data satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) if there is no
sequence xk1 , xk2 , . . . , xkn such that
xk1 R xk2R, . . . , Rxkn while xkn P xk1 . (1)
A violation of GARP is identified with a sequence xk1 , xk2 , . . . , xkn . We say that n is
the length of the sequence.
Given a sequence xk1 , xk2 , . . . , xkn for which (1) holds, we can compute the money
pump cost associated to this sequence as
n∑
l=1
pkl · (xkl − xkl+1),
where we interpret n+ 1 as 1.
Remark 1. Testing for GARP, and calculating money pump costs, can be a huge com-
putational task. For the data we present in Section 4, K = 26; so there are
26∑
k=2
(
26
k
)
(k − 1)! ≈ 4.39239× 1025
potential cycles, which are unique up to rotations.
One can check for violations of GARP involving sequences of limited length. There
is, unfortunately, loss of generality in doing so (see Rose (1958) and Shafer (1977)).
In general, even if every subset of K − 1 observations out of K price-consumption data
satisfies GARP, the entire K observations may violate GARP.
Our money pump cost is measured in dollars. We normalize the cost to make it
comparable with today’s dollars, and to compare across consumers with different budgets.
Specifically, we present money pump cost as the proportion of total expenditure. If (1)
holds for the sequence xk1 , xk2 , . . . , xkn , we compute the relative money pump cost of the
sequence as ∑n
l=1 p
kl · (xkl − xkl+1)∑n
l=1 p
kl · xkl , (2)
where we interpret n+ 1 as 1.
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4 Main results: incidence and severity of GARP vi-
olations
4.1 Data Description
In this paper, we use the so-called “Stanford Basket Dataset”, which is a household-level
scanner panel dataset, which contains grocery expenditure data for 494 households from
four grocery stores in an urban area of a large US midwestern city, between June 1991
and June 1993 (104 weeks). This dataset was collected by Information Resources, Inc.
(IRI), and has also been used in, among others, Bell and Lattin (1998), Shum (2004),
and Hendel and Nevo (2006b,a). We focus in this paper on households’ expenditures
on food categories, of which there are fourteen: bacon, barbecue, butter, cereal, coffee,
cracker, eggs, ice-cream, nuts, analgesics, pizza, snack, and sugar.2
We observe 103,345 transactions of 4,082 unique items: i.e unique Universal Product
Codes (UPC). Each transaction records the consumer (household) identity, store identi-
fication number, UPC, transaction week, consumed units, price per unit (cent), and the
item’s relative scale.3
In order to obtain consistent consumption data over goods and time, we aggregate
transactions by brand name and category: when distinct items have a common brand
name, their transactions are aggregated. Hence, each “product” in the sample is a food
product with a distinct brand name, and we aggregate across all sizes/presentational
forms of each product. Analogously, aggregate prices at the product level are obtained
by averaging the prices of each size, weighted by the amount consumed. To minimize
stockpiling and inventory issues, we also aggregate households’ expenditures for each
good over time, to a four-week period.4
2We proceed the section including analgesics as food. Indeed, when we process data as the subsequent
paragraphs, amongst 375 only 4 items are categorized as analgesics, and including them or not only
changes the empirical results marginally.
3For each category, the relative scale is the weight of an item compared to the standard weight. 16oz
is the standard weight of a coffee item, so the relative scale of a coffee product of 24oz is 1.5.
4By focusing on food expenditures, our approach requires an assumption that food items are sepa-
rable in households’ preferences, so that purchases of non-foods affect food consumption only through
the income left over from such purchases. Hence, our test is implicitly a joint test of rationality and
separability for food. However, separability is ubiquitous as an assumption in applied demand analysis,
and has been universally assumed in applied work to reduce the dimensionality of demand system (a
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Maximum Cycle Length 2 3 4
Total Numb. Households 494 494 494
Households Violating GARP 395 396 396
Median Money Pump 5.97% 5.95% 5.91%
Mean Money Pump 6.22% 6.12% 6.09%
Possible Cycles 325 5525 95225
Median Numb. Violations 2 3 3
Mean Numb. Violations 2.421 3.874 4.815
Table 1: Money Pump: calculated by Equation 2, averaged over households violating
GARP
Even after this aggregation, not all brands are consumed for every time period; some
are newly launched, taken off the market, or simply not popular. Since GARP requires
price observations over every time period, we use only brands for which price data are
available for every time period. For this reason, we drop 12,976 (or 12.5 %) of the
purchasesfrom the dataset.
4.2 GARP and Money Pump Cost
Table 1 presents a summary of our results. Out of 494 households, 395 (roughly 80%) of
them violate WARP (GARP for sequences of length 2) for at least some pairs of obser-
vations. Hence, a significant proportion of households do exhibit violations of WARP, in
contrast to much of the previous empirical literature, which fail to find many violations.
Given Remark 1, we only check for violations of GARP that involve cycles of limited
length: lengths 2, 3 and 4. In Table 1, each column corresponds to the maximum length
of the cycles in the test for GARP. When we include cycles of length 3 and 4, thereby
searching a substantially larger number of possible cycles (5,525 and 95,225, compared to
325), the overall number of households violating GARP increases only by 1. As we men-
tioned in Section 3, in theory GARP may be violated when WARP is satisfied. However,
Table 1 shows that WARP closely approximates GARP in practice. Only one household
satisfies WARP while violating GARP with a sequence of length 3. Moreover, the median
and mean level of money pump costs change marginally as we search over longer cycles.
point emphasized by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Blundell (1988), among others).
9
On the other hand, the severity of the violations, in terms of money pump cost, is
moderate or small: the mean and median money pump costs, taken across all households,
are only about 6% of total expenditure.5
To break this down further, we calculated, for each household, the relative money
pump cost (see Equation 2) of each violation of WARP, and obtained the household-
specific median and mean level of the cost, across all the cycles for this household,
which violated WARP. In Figure 4.2, we plot the cumulative distribution function of
this household-specific median money pump cost, across the 395 households which ex-
hibit some violation of WARP. Clearly, this function rises very steeply for values of the
money pump < 10%, but is largely flat thereafter. This indicates that a large majority of
households have very small violations of WARP, and only a few handfuls of households
have larger violations, exceeding 10% of expenditures. Thus, large violations do occur,
but they are infrequent.
4.3 Demographic Variables
We study the demographic determinants of rational (or irrational) consumption behavior.
We consider the following demographic dummy variables:
1. Family Size: Middle and Large. A mid-sized household has 3 or 4 members, and a
large household has more than 4 members. Small families are the baseline.
2. Income: Middle and High. A household with a middle income earns more than
20,000 and less than 45,000; a household with a high income earns more than
45,000. Low income is the baseline.
3. Age: Middle and Old. The age variable reflects the average of the spouses’ ages.
In cases of either a missing husband or wife, the age of a household is the surviving
member’s age. 6
5Without including analgesics, 400 households violate WARP, and their average median money pump
cost is also about 6%.
6The original data contains the age levels of each household’s husband and wife: (1) 18 to 29, (2)
30 to 34, (3) 35 to 44, (4) 45 to 54, (5) 55 to 64, and (6) 65 to 99. A household with an average age
index between 4 and 6 is categorized as middle aged, and a household with the average equals to 6 is
categorized as old.
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Variables Households
Family Size Mid Size 187
Large Size 65
Income Mid Income 200
High Income 141
Age Mid Age 201
Old Age 157
Education High School 197
College 255
Total Households 480
Table 2: Demographic Variables
4. Education: High school and College. The household’s education level is the av-
erage level the spouses’ education. Depending on the average level, we categorize
households as high school graduates, college graduates, and others. In cases of a
missing husband or wife, the education level reflects the education of the sole head
of the household. 7
Table 4.3 shows the population distributions of the demographic variables. The de-
mographic data is missing for 14 households. We drop these from our data set, and work
with 480 households. The panelists are generally older, and their education levels are
higher than the general U.S. population.
Since the money pump cost has a positive value only when consumptions violate
WARP, we consider censored Tobit regressions of the money pump costs on demographic
variables. Table 4.3 shows the regression results with 156,000 (=480 × 325) observations:
480 households with
(
26
2
)
possible cycles.
7The original data contains the education levels for each household’s husband and wife: (1) some
grade school, (2) completed grade school, (3) some high school, (4) completed high school, (5) some
college, (6) completed college, (7) post graduate school, and (8) technical school. We take each couple’s
averaged education level. A household with an average between 3 to 5 is categorized as high school
leveled education, and a household with an average above 5 is categorized as college leveled education.
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MidAge 0.0114*
(1.97)
OldAge 0.0118
(1.63)
MidFamily -0.0161*** -0.0112* -0.00811
(-3.55) (-2.36) (-1.59)
LargeFamily -0.0281*** -0.0239*** -0.0188*
(-4.04) (-3.39) (-2.49)
MidIncome -0.0153** -0.0146*
(-2.67) (-2.43)
HighIncome -0.0186*** -0.0178**
(-3.40) (-2.93)
highsch -0.0154 -0.00856 -0.00771
(-1.84) (-1.00) (-0.89)
college -0.0162 -0.00589 -0.00397
(-1.95) (-0.67) (-0.44)
cons -0.452*** -0.450*** -0.463***
(-30.63) (-30.58) (-27.55)
sigma
cons 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.195***
(36.65) (36.66) (36.66)
N 156000 156000 156000
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 3: Money pump violations of GARP, explained by demographics.
The money pump cost of a violation is higher for older, poorer and less educated
households, than for younger, richer and more educated households. These correlations
are intuitive and easy to explain. The money pump cost is also higher for smaller house-
holds, which is somewhat puzzling. The regressors are highly correlated, so some of the
specifications in Table 4.3 show the variables not being significant.
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5 Further results
5.1 Seasonality and Stability of preferences.
A consumer may fail GARP because his preferences change: they are not “stable.”
Given two observations, (x, p) and (x′, p′), it is possible that x was a rational choice for a
different utility function than x′. We argue that unstable preferences would be reflected
in large money pump costs. Therefore, our empirical findings support the hypothesis
that preferences are stable.
Consider a consumer who uses one utility for some purchases, and another utility
for other purchases. We argue that the money pump cost is positive, for arbitrarily
small changes in prices. In fact, the money pump cost is larger when the difference in
demands under both utilities is larger, thus implying that when preferences are unstable,
the money pump cost can be interpreted as a measure of this instability.
Specifically, consider Figure 4(a). Suppose that a household follows two distinct
utility functions. These two utility functions give rise to two different demand functions:
d1(p, I) and d2(p, I). Fix prices p, and suppose that, at p, we observe x = d1(p, I); see
Figure 4(a). The second utility, on the other hand, would give demand xˆ = d2(p, I).
Now, by continuity of demand, if we choose prices p′ close to p (as in the figure) then
x′ = d2(p′, I) is close to xˆ. But this implies a violation of WARP.
The money pump of the violation of WARP in Figure 4(a) is (p′ − p) · (x′ − x). We
can look at the money pump cost for an arbitrarily small change in prices. In particular,
fix a direction of change in price ∇p, and consider an infinitesimal price change in p in
the direction of ∇. So p′ = p + ε∇p; for ε > 0. As ε shrinks to 0, x′ converges to xˆ, so
the money pump cost approaches (xˆ− x) · ε∇p; see Figure 4(b). So a small price change
gives an increase in pump cost, as long as the change in prices forms an acute angle with
the difference in the demand functions. Note also that a larger difference in demands
results in a larger pump cost, for a given direction of change of prices.
Given this interpretation of the money pump cost as a measure of an agent’s changes
in preferences, we next look and see whether the money pump cost reflects seasonal trends
in demand for certain types of grocery items, because these trends may be attributable
to changes in preferences over time. Specifically, we focus on the case of ice cream
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demand, for which the seasonal peak in demand is during the summer months, and the
seasonal trough is during the winter months. If this seasonality is in fact due to changing
preferences, then we should expect to see larger money pump costs in cycles involving
peak and non-peak periods, than in cycles involving only non-peak periods.
Spring Summer Fall Winter
Spring 1.3333 0.6944 1.0556 0.9375
(1.90%) (1.84%) (2.00%) (2.16%)
Summer · 1.2000 0.8333 1.2292
(2.13%) (1.65%) (1.52%)
Fall · · 1.0667 0.9583
(1.82%) (1.78%)
Winter · · · 1.6429
(1.87%)
Table 4: No evidence of changing preferences: Ice-cream vs. Other foods.
Such evidence is presented in Table 4. We aggregate data up to ‘Ice-creams’ or
‘all other foods’, and for every 4-week (1-period). For each pair of periods, we count
the number of households violating WARP, and compute the average of their median
money pump costs. Numbers (or parenthesized numbers) in the table are the numbers
of households (or average levels of their median money pump costs), which are averaged
over the pairs of periods falling into a corresponding pair of seasons.8
Surprisingly, we find no evidence of seasonality. For instance, the money pump costs
are 1.52% between summer and winter months (a peak/non-peak comparison), versus
2.16% between the winter and spring months (two non-peak periods). This suggests
that, while seasonality may indeed be present, prices may also be moving in a fashion
such that agents’ resulting consumption choices do not violate rationality.9
8In this table, the data is aggregated further than the previous section. There must be no confusion
between 395 households violating WARP in the previous section versus on average 1.x households in
Table 4.
9Indeed, Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) provide evidence prices on grocery items tend to be
lower during peak demand periods for these items (see also Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2005) for further
discussion). Such “countercyclical” price variation may mask any seasonal variation in preferences, and
lead to no violations of revealed preference.
14
5.2 Bronars index.
It is customary, in applied revealed preference analysis, to compute an index of the power
of the test, the Bronars (1987) index. We are in a somewhat different situation compared
to most studies, because we find a large number of violations of GARP. So the power
of GARP is not a concern for us, probably because of the nature of our data set, as we
outline in the introduction.
Nevertheless, we computed the Bronars index. We find, surprisingly, that the Bronars
index indicates low power. Specifically, the Bronars index consists of measuring the
number of violations of GARP if behavior on the observed budget sets were purely
random. Using budget lines computed from the real data, we generate 100 samples
of consumption data sets where each household choose a consumption bundle purely at
random on the budget line. We find that amongst 494 there are on average 3-4 households
violating GARP for each generated panel data set, while the actual choice data show 396
households violating GARP.
We attribute the phenomenon to a basic flaw in the Bronars index. Purely random
behavior is not so irrational: a point made originally by Becker (1962). The irrationality
of our consumers is due to some kind of systematic tendency or bias; it is not due to
purely random behavior. On the other hand, their irrationality is not severe enough to
cause high levels of money pump cost.
6 Conclusion
We present a new measure of the severity of a violation of GARP, and an application to
scanner data. We find that the vast majority of the households in our data set violate
GARP at some point, but that the median violation is usually rather mild. Our findings
contrast with the extant empirical literature, which tends to find very few violations of
GARP.
The money pump measure is intuitive and easy to interpret. It rests on ideas similar
to Afriat’s and Varian’s efficiency indices, but it is grounded in an economic “story,”
and a specific value for the index has a direct interpretation, as a measure of either the
severity of a GARP violation, or the instability of household preferences.
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of households’ median money pump costs
p
p′
xˆ = d2(p, I)
x
x′
(a) x = d1(p, I), and x′ = d2(p′, I).
p
xˆ
x
(xˆ−
x)
∇
p
(b) mp = ∇p · (d2(p, I)− d2(p, I)).
Figure 4: Unstable preferences.
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Appendix A An algorithm to calculate the money
pump cost
As we remarked in Section 3, calculating the money pump is computationally very heavy.
Here we present an algorithm that will approximate the money pump cost, and runs in
polynomial time. We did not need to use the approximation in our paper, because the
pump costs from violations of WARP capture almost all the pump cost; we include the
algorithm because it may be useful in applications to other data sets.
The revealed preference graph is the graph that has the consumption vectors xk as
vertexes, and a (directed) edge pointing from xk to xl if pk · xk ≥ pkxl.
The adjacency matrix of the graph has K columns and one row for each edge. The
edge pointing from xk to xl corresponds to the row el − ek. We denote by ek the vector
in RK with all zeroes except for a 1 in position k.
A basic fact from graph theory (see Theorem 14.5 in Berge (2001)) says that a graph
can be decomposed into cycles if and only if the sum of the rows of its adjacency matrix
is 0 (the null vector in RK).
Note that c(x1, . . . xK) is the following sum∑
C
∑
e∈C
peo · (xeo − xed),
where C is the set of cycles of the revealed preference graph, e is a generic edge of a
cycle, and eo is the origin and ed the destination of edge e.
Consider the following algorithm.
1. Initialize a 1×K matrix A to be identically zero. Initialize M to 0.
2. Repeat the following for each k, l = 1, . . . , K with k 6= l:
If pl · xk ≤ pk · xk then let M be
M + pk · (xk − xl);
and add a row el − ek to A.
3. Output A and M .
17
Note:
1. We run step (2) K × (K − 1) times, so this algorithm is polynomial.
2. A is the adjacency matrix of the revealed-preference graph.
3. If the revealed preference graph can be decomposed into cycles, then the rows of A
will add to zero (to the K dimensional null vector).
4. The algorithm adds up the pump cost of each edge in the revealed preference graph.
If the rows of A add to zero, then M will be the correct money-pump measure. In
general, M exceeds the money pump measure.
Let v be the vector that is the sum of all the rows of A. So v = 1 · A. We can now
use v to correct any excess edges pk · (xk − xl) we should not have added to M because
they are not part of a cycle.
Let I be the set of all possible starting (negative) vertexes in v and O the set of all
destiny (positive) vertexes in v, with repetitions. That is: Let I be the (multi) set that
has |−vk| copies of k, and O be the (multi) set that has |vl| copies of l. So the I is the
set of sources of an edge and O is the set of destinies, with repetitions.
The “corrected” money pump measure is:
M −
∑
k∈I,l∈O
∣∣pk · (xk − xl)∣∣
In principle, the problem is that v “forgets” the edges in A. It only records who
was the origin of a non-cycle edge, and who was a destiny (and how many times). For
example, if we have K = 4 and
v = (1,−1, 1,−1)
we don’t know if we should correct for (1,−1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1,−1), i.e. subtract p2 ·x1 +
p4 ·x3; or if we should correct for (1, 0, 0,−1) and (0,−1, 1, 0), i.e. subtract p4 ·x1 +p2 ·x3
The corrected measure may still not be right. For example, if v = (1,−1, 1,−1)
we may have that both (1,−1, 0, 0) and (0,−1, 1, 0) are edges, but the latter is part of
a cycle. Then the corrected measure would have subtracted something it should not.
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However, if this happens we would know that something is wrong because we used x2 as
the source of an edge twice in the correction.
Our sense is that the algorithm will provide a good approximation to the true pump
cost, but an experimental verification is probably needed before one uses the algorithm.
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